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COVARIANT RISK AND NUTRIENT CREDIT TRADING
BRIAN SAWERS*
Every summer, a dead zone is created in the Chesapeake Bay. The
dead zone is created by too much of a good thing: nutrients, especially
nitrogen and phosphorus. The largest source of excess nutrients in the
Chesapeake is agriculture; manure and artificial fertilizers are washed into
streams that eventually reach the bay.1 In the bay, nitrogen and phosphorus
create an algae bloom, which consumes all the dissolved oxygen. Some
fish escape, but other creatures expire in this dead sea within the
Chesapeake Bay.2
To reduce the excess nutrients reaching the bay, several states are
experimenting with nutrient credit trading.3 A large part of the appeal is
political: Nutrient credit trading is popular in an ideological climate hostile
to regulation. Part of the appeal is a response to policy success. Pollution
trading reduced acid rain at low costs, which raised hopes that
environmental markets can produce outsized benefits at low costs. To date,
nutrient credit trading has disappointed and it is likely to continue to
disappoint. Better market design cannot remedy the inherent defects in
nutrient credits. This Article identifies previously unidentified defects in
nutrient credit markets, contributing to an already large literature on the
shortcomings of nutrient credit trading. This Article adds to the weight of
mounting evidence that nutrient credit trading cannot deliver improvements
in water quality.
I. WHY NUTRIENT CREDIT TRADING?
The enthusiasm for environmental markets in general, and nutrient
credit trading in particular, does not rely solely on their merits. The
intellectual climate in academia and the political climate in government has
been hostile to direct government regulation for several decades. In a
policy environment where government mandates are disfavored and all
things “market” are favored, nutrient credit trading is an attractive answer to
© 2018 Brain Sawers.
* I would like to thank Shi-Ling Hsu, Jonathan Nash, and Michael Pappas. Disclosure: I was
paid by the Conservation Voters of Pennsylvania for related research.
1. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD
FOR NITROGEN, PHOSPHORUS AND SEDIMENT 4–29 (2010) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE TMDL].
2. Id. at ES-3.
3. In addition to Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia have nutrient credit trading schemes.
MD. CODE REGS. 15.20.12 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.19:12 (West 2005).
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poor water quality. While all markets depend on government to some
degree, environmental markets are entirely creatures of regulation since the
goods traded are valuable only to the extent that the goods allow the owner
to avoid government sanction. The political and intellectual appeal of
environmental markets received a significant boost by the success of the
market for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.4 The ideological appeal of
“market” solutions cannot entirely explain the current enthusiasm for
nutrient credit trading. Instead, the current fervor for nutrient credit trading
is partly the result of the political power of farmers, coupled with a trend
towards disguised taxation.
There are two reasons why requiring farmers to reduce the flow of
excess nutrients is difficult. Most importantly, farmers have political power
disproportionate to their numbers or wealth. The second reason is that
excess nutrients in the stream are invisible, at least until the inevitable algae
bloom. The dead zone in the Chesapeake Bay is not visible from land, let
alone from Pennsylvania. Furthermore, the contribution of any individual
farm is both small and cannot be distinguished from other sources of excess
nutrients.
Excess nutrients are not an inevitable byproduct of agriculture. Rather,
they are the result of specific choices made by farmers to grow certain crops
in a particular way. Better management practices would retain nutrients on
the farm and thus out of the stream, but many of those practices are costly.
Farmers will lobby against rules requiring better farming practices,
especially if the practices are expensive, but even if the practices are merely
novel. Thus, government believes it cannot require farmers to protect water
quality. Instead, nutrient credit trading enables government to bribe farmers
to adopt better management practices.
Maryland raises the revenue to fund bribes to farmers (and others)
transparently. Maryland imposes a “flush tax” of sixty dollars on each
sewer bill with the revenue dedicated to water quality projects.
Municipalities receive money to upgrade waste water treatment plants.
Homeowners receive money for septic tanks that retain nutrients. Farmers
are paid to plant cover crops, a better management practice that retains
sediment and nutrients in the field.5
In contrast, Pennsylvania has chosen to disguise the taxes necessary to
fund the bribes paid to its farmers. Nutrient credit trading does not impose

4. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency established a market in pollution credits in
the Acid Rain Program under the authority of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7651 (2012); see e.g., The Invisible Green Hand, ECONOMIST (July 4, 2002),
http://www.economist.com/node/1200205 (calling the Acid Rain Program the “greatest green
success story of the past decade”).
5. 2012 Md. Laws 927, 933–38.
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a direct charge on either taxpayers or water ratepayers. Instead, the costs
imposed are distributed by the sale of nutrient credits, which disguises both
the amount and the ultimate recipients. In a nutrient trading scheme like
Pennsylvania’s, the buyers of nutrient credits are developers and waste
water treatment plants. Both developers and waste water treatment plants
will shift the costs onward. Developers are not charities; whatever costs are
imposed on the construction of new homes are ultimately borne by the
buyers of new homes. Waste water treatment plants run by private entities
will similarly shift the cost to ratepayers. Even public waste water
treatment plants must cover their costs, so the cost of buying nutrient credits
will be shifted to ratepayers. Instead of a transparent tax on each user, new
homes will be more expensive and water bills will be higher, concealing the
true burden of the scheme. Farmers are expected to be the largest source of
nutrient credits and thus the ultimate recipients of much of this
redistribution through disguised taxation.
Although several other states in the Chesapeake watershed do operate
nutrient credit markets, Pennsylvania is particularly worthy of attention.
Even though Pennsylvania does not border the Chesapeake Bay, its impact
is outsized because of its share of the land area of the drainage and its large
number of farms, especially dairy farms. Each year, the manure from a
single dairy cow includes more than 360 pounds of nitrogen and 60 pounds
of phosphorus.6 Roughly half the farms in the Chesapeake watershed are in
Pennsylvania. The nutrient pollution in the Susquehanna has a greater
effect than pollution elsewhere in the Chesapeake watershed.7
Pennsylvania contributes forty-four percent of the nitrogen and twenty-four
percent of phosphorus flowing into the Bay.8 The next largest contributor
of nitrogen to the Bay is Virginia, which is responsible for twenty-seven
percent of the total.9 Of the excess nutrients contributed by agriculture,
Pennsylvania contributes more than half the nitrogen and a quarter of the
phosphorus.10 Thus, Pennsylvania’s nutrient credit trading program
deserves special scrutiny, given its importance to the Chesapeake.
In Pennsylvania, the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”)
oversees nutrient credit trading, including certifying credits.11 Most buyers
of nutrient credits hold National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
6. UNIV. OF CAL. COOP. EXTENSION, MANURE TECHNICAL GUIDE SERIES: DAIRY MANURE
NUTRIENT CONTENT AND FORMS (2009).
7. CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 1, at ES-7 tbl. ES-1; ES-6 fig. ES-2. For contribution
by watershed, see id. at 4-3 to 4-4 figs. 4-4, 4-5 & 4-6.
8. Id. at 4-1 to 4-2 figs. 4-1, 4-2 & 4-3.
9. Id. Virginia, however, does contribute more phosphorus than Pennsylvania. Id. at 4-2
fig. 4-3.
10. Id. at 4-5 fig. 4-1 & 4-2.
11. 25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (2010).
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(“NPDES”) permits.12
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) has delegated the authority to issue NPDES permits to DEP, but
retains authority to police the permits. Nutrient credit trading in
Pennsylvania began in 2004, predating the EPA’s determination of
Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load for Nitrogen, Phosphorus and
Sediment (“TMDL”).13 As of 2017, Pennsylvania is likely to miss its
pollutant reduction targets under the Chesapeake TMDL. Waste water
treatment plants are on-track to meet their targets, whereas agriculture is
not.14
II. RECOGNIZED CHALLENGES
The literature on nutrient credit trading has identified several
shortcomings. The first problem is verification, since the returns to fraud
are significant. Secondly, trading between point sources and nonpoint
sources presents the possibility of regulatory arbitrage and reduced
compliance. Thirdly, establishing a market in nutrient credit requires
establishing a baseline that determines which activities generate credits.
Setting the wrong baseline can impede the development of a market in
nutrient credits or produce smaller than anticipated environmental benefits.
Lastly, many environmental markets establish trading ratios between
different nutrient credits, which can similarly hobble market development.
Ensuring the validity of nutrient credits is a significant and persistent
problem. Nutrient credits are valuable and thus there is money to be made
in faking them. Ordinarily, buyers police the quality of the goods
themselves. Thus, supermarkets do not sell counterfeit avocados because
customers can tell the difference and prefer an actual avocado to papiermâché or plastic replica avocados. But, no one buys a nutrient credit for
themselves since the nutrient credits have no value to the buyer except to
satisfy a government mandate. If there is no or low risk of detection,
buyers will prefer cheaper counterfeit credits to more expensive real credits.
In this way, nutrient credits are analogous to engagement rings. Generally,
the fiancé buys the ring for his fiancée. If an unscrupulous jeweler offered
him a counterfeit diamond for less, he would prefer that,15 assuming his
deception would not be discovered. The ring has no value to him; its only
value is to the third party.
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012) (establishing a national permit program for the “discharge of
any pollutant, or combination of pollutants”).
13. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PENNSYLVANIA’S TRADING AND OFFSET
PROGRAMS REVIEW OBSERVATIONS 9 (2012).
14. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, INTERIM EVALUATION OF PENNSYLVANIA’S 2016–
2017 MILESTONES PROGRESS 1 (2012).
15. To readers who are the author’s wife: he did not do that.
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Even if government can prevent the trading of counterfeit nutrient
credits, low-quality credits will come to dominate, reducing the overall
environmental benefit. Nutrient credits are akin to money, since these
credits are both a medium of exchange and a measure of value.16 Like
money, nutrient credits are subject to Gresham’s Law. Gresham’s Law is a
principle of monetary economics that “bad money drives out good.”17 But
here, the mechanism is somewhat different. When money was coin, people
would hoard coins with more gold or silver and spend coins with less
valuable alloys. In the market, bad money (with little gold or silver) would
drive out good money. The mechanics of Gresham’s Law in nutrient
credits are different, since credits expire at the end of the water year, which
limits hoarding. Yet, a similar dynamic operates since all nutrients are not
the same quality, just like coins. Here, lower quality means the credit
represents a smaller or less certain environmental benefit. Lower-quality
credits will often be cheaper to generate and thus undercut high-quality
credits on price. So long as buyers do not distinguish between the quality
of credits, the cheapest credits will dominate the market. If the cheapest
credits are also low quality, the worst credits will outcompete nutrient credit
of higher quality.
All environmental markets suffer from verification problems, but
nutrient credits are more susceptible for two reasons. First, the number of
sellers is greater than in other pollution credit markets.18 There are 84,000
farms in the Chesapeake watershed.19 Even if a small share of farms
generates credits, the number of credit generators would be large and thus
the cost of verification would be colossal. Second, many of the agricultural
practices that generate credits are difficult to monitor. Some agricultural
practices, like riparian buffers, can be monitored somewhat cheaply. A
single site visit can confirm the existence of a riparian buffer; infrequent
trips back to the farm can confirm whether the buffer has been damaged by
heavy rain or grazing. In contrast, some agricultural practices require
essentially continuous monitoring to confirm whether nutrients are being
16. Nutrient credits do not satisfy the third characteristic of money since these credits are not
a good store of value. Credits expire at the end of the water year and so do not hold their value.
17. Although named after Sir Thomas Gresham, the process has been observed many times
since the advent of money. See, e.g., The Frogs by Aristophanes, in THREE GREEK PLAYS FOR
THE THEATRE 173 (Peter D. Arnott ed., trans., 1961).
18. The Acid Rain Program applies to 1226 facilities for SO2 and 336 facilities for NOx, but
the number of entities trading is much smaller since most firms own many facilities. Less than a
fifth of trades of SO2 are between separate entities; the rest are related-party transactions. U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 2015 Program Progress—Cross-State Air Pollution Rule and Acid
Rain Program 14, 52 (2015).
19. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, CHESAPEAKE BAY 2011 ACTIVITIES REPORT 1 (2011).
EPA estimates a slightly higher figure of 87,000 farms. CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 1, at 429.
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kept out of the stream. For example, manure spreading or tillage practices
would need to be monitored throughout the year. Farmers generate credits
when manure or fertilizer is applied at rates below agronomic rates in the
current Penn State University Agronomy Guide.20 Thus, verifying the
nutrient credit means monitoring the amount and the timing of manure
application, not just whether manure was applied or not.
Verification problems are largely a problem of nonpoint sources.
Point sources are much better positioned to generate credits of high quality
because these sources maintain ongoing monitoring of their discharge.
Waste water treatment plants can generate nutrient credits when those
plants remove more nutrients than required by law. Plants can generate
cleaner water than required by investing in better equipment or running the
plant differently, which is costly. If a waste water plant exceeds the
regulatory baseline, that excess represents a reduction in nutrients being
returned to the stream and thus is a credit. Absent outright fraud and record
falsification, waste water treatment plants generate nutrient credits of high
quality because nutrients in the water discharged are already monitored
continuously.
Among nutrient credits generated by nonpoint sources, hauling poultry
manure outside of the Chesapeake watershed presents the smallest
verification problems. Unlike swine and cattle manure, poultry manure is
dry, which makes hauling economical since the amount of nitrogen and
phosphorus is high relative to the water content and thus the weight of the
load. The trucks can be weighed leaving the farm and arriving at the
destination, where the poultry manure is applied according to a nutrient
management plan.21 Generally, the main destination for poultry manure are
reclaimed mining sites where fertilizer would be applied anyway to
encourage re-growth, which also controls erosion.
Trading between point and nonpoint sources is generally expected to
constitute most of the activity in nutrient credit markets. In fact, it is often
the rationale. Many point sources have already taken all the cheaper steps
to reduce their discharges. Any further improvements in water quality are
more expensive. In contrast, nonpoint sources have taken fewer steps,
leaving more of the cheaper steps still to be done. Thus, the cost of
reducing nutrients in the stream from the typical nonpoint source is cheaper
than from the typical point source. For a point source, it is generally
cheaper to pay a nonpoint source to reduce its nutrient contribution to the
stream than it is for the point source to make further nutrient reductions in
its discharge.
20. 25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (d)(3) (2010).
21. PA. DEPT. ENVTL. PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
NUTRIENT TRADING SUPPLEMENT 8 (2016).
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Trading between point and non-point sources presents the risk of
regulatory arbitrage. As the locus of nutrient reduction shifts from
regulated point sources to unregulated nonpoint sources, the ability of nongovernment actors to monitor and help enforce environmental law is
weakened. The Clean Water Act permits citizen suits against point sources
that do not comply with a standard, limit, or order.22 Trading, however,
undermines this remedy by shifting compliance from point to nonpoint
sources. If a waste water treatment plant failed to comply with a standard,
limit, or order, an affected citizen could sue the plant. Instead, if the waste
water treatment plant buys nutrient credits that do not represent real
environmental benefits, there is no potential for a citizen suit. A citizen suit
is not permitted against the nonpoint source, even if that source produces a
defective credit, which means that the point source credit buyer is
noncompliant. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine whether trading
has produced regulatory arbitrage without knowing how many credits are
defective, which is difficult because of verification problems already
discussed.
A third problem that nutrient credit trading faces is the challenge of
setting the baseline. Since nutrient credits represent reductions in nutrients
beyond the baseline, the regulator must determine a baseline before any
credits can be generated.23 The baseline identifies a number, or set of
numbers, from which all credits are calculated. All nutrient credits are
measured from this baseline; the baseline is the zero in the number system.
If the baseline is set too low, a nutrient credit is cheap to generate.
Farmers, like other producers, generally know their own costs and thus
prioritize, taking the easiest and cheapest steps first and leaving the more
difficult and expensive steps until later. But, each credit generated from a
low baseline represents a small environmental benefit. Sellers generate
many credits and credits are cheap, but the environmental benefit is smaller
since the starting point was set low. Thus, a low baseline is good for
nutrient credit trading since credits are cheap and plentiful, but bad for the
environment. Since improvement in water quality is the goal and nutrient
credit trading is only the means, a low baseline elevates the process at the
expense of the goal.
Conversely, a high baseline means that sellers cannot generate credits
by taking cheaper and easiest steps. Instead, sellers can only generate
credits by taking more difficult and expensive steps to reduce their pollution
even more. Under a high baseline, sellers will find credits expensive to
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 135.1–135.2 (2016) (providing notice
and standing requirements for citizen suits).
23. Pollution credits do not depend on a baseline. Instead, the regulator decides how much
pollution to permit and then distributes or auctions shares of the total permitted pollution.
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generate. Each nutrient credit will represent a larger environmental benefit.
Yet, the high baseline will deter many sellers from participating because
each credit is too expensive to generate.24 If sellers do not participate, the
anticipated environmental benefits may not materialize.
Pennsylvania has set a high baseline, at least relative to actually
existing farm practices. A high baseline discourages farmer involvement
and means that nutrient credits are expensive. In Pennsylvania, the baseline
is set at the management practices required by state law. Farmers must
comply with management practices set by four different statutory
requirements: erosion and sediment control, pollution control, nutrient
management, and concentrated animal feeding operations, if applicable.25
In addition, there are specific requirements for riparian buffers and fertilizer
application.26
Sellers must show that their farm exceeds the legal standard to
generate a credit. At first blush, asking farmers to follow the law before
being rewarded does not seem like a high baseline. Yet, the lack of
enforcement by the state and the lack of compliance by farmers means that
minimum standards set by state law are actually a high baseline to set.
State management practices are observed in the breach, meaning that most
farmers cannot generate credits without first spending significant resources
to meet the state standard. Only the portion of the improvement that
exceeds the state standard generates a marketable credit. Before generating
a single nutrient credit, a farmer would have to take expensive steps to
bring their agricultural practices into compliance with state law, but these
laws are not enforced. All the expense of meeting the state agricultural
standards falls on the farmer since no credits are generated. Thus, the cost
of generating nutrient credits is high for many farmers.27
Some environmental markets set a trading ratio between different
credits. Trading ratios are supposed to compensate for the uncertainty
associated with nonpoint nutrient control or allow for trading one pollutant
for another. Additionally, trading ratios can be used to adjust for
differences where the pollution is introduced or between different
pollutants. For example, upstream pollution could be treated more leniently
than downstream pollution because less of the upstream pollution will reach
24. Gaurav Ghosh et al., Baseline Requirements Can Hinder Trades in Water Quality
Trading Programs: Evidence from the Conestoga Watershed, 92 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 2076, 2083
(2011).
25. 25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (d)(2) (2010).
26. 25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (d)(3) (2010).
27. If Pennsylvania enforced its state agricultural standards, then farmers would already meet
the standard and any improvements beyond that would generate nutrient credits. Of course, if
Pennsylvania enforced its agricultural standards, there might be less need for nutrient credit
trading.
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the bay. While traveling to the bay, some nutrients are used up or trapped
in sediment, so excess nutrients far upstream have a smaller impact.
Alternately, credits for nitrogen could be exchanged for phosphorus credits.
A trading ratio is effectively a discount or exchange rate applied to a
credit, making it less valuable. In comparison to nonpoint sources, the
discharge from point sources is less variable while being better monitored.
The EPA notes that nonpoint sources generate credits that are less certain in
measurement, implementation, and performance.28 Thus, regulators may
treat a credit from a nonpoint source as less valuable.29 The uncertainty that
nonpoint source nutrient credits suffer from makes determining the
appropriate discount or exchange rate difficult. Are nonpoint source
nutrient credits worth half of point source nutrient credits? If the regulator
knew how little the nonpoint source nutrient credit was worth, then it would
not be uncertain, and no discount would be necessary. In addition, any
fixed trading ratio will allow arbitrage between the relatively cheaper credit
and the more expensive credit. Even if the ratio was initially set at the
correct level, time may shift the costs of nutrient removal to make the ratio
no longer true.
Pennsylvania does not permit trading nutrients; therefore, nitrogen
cannot be traded for phosphorus. Reductions in excess nutrients are
adjusted for where the pollutants enter the stream since excess nutrients
introduced downstream have a greater impact on the Chesapeake. The DEP
has calculated delivery ratios for all significant point sources30 and for
stream segments.31 The delivery ratio allows trading between downstream
and upstream sources. Without a delivery ratio to adjust for the differential
rates of nutrients reaching the bay, the environmental benefits would be
unpredictable. All nutrient credits in Pennsylvania are subject to a ten
percent reserve, regardless of source.32 When Pennsylvania began nutrient
credit trading, the scheme imposed a twenty percent adjustment on credits
generated by nonpoint sources.33 In 2014, EPA objected to NPDES permits
issued by Pennsylvania’s DEP that permitted nutrient credit trading, since
reductions from farms cannot be measured accurately.34 To preserve
28. U.S. ENVT’L PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT FOR PERMIT
WRITERS: WATER QUALITY TRADING SCENARIO: POINT SOURCE–NONPOINT SOURCE TRADING 4
(2009).
29. James S. Shortle & Richard D. Horan, Water Quality Trading, 14 PA. ST. ENVT’L L.
REV. 231, 243 (2006).
30. PA. DEPT. ENVT’L PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
WASTEWATER SUPPLEMENT 5 (2017).
31. 25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (c) (2010).
32. 25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (a) (2010).
33. 25 PA. CODE § 96.8 (d) (2010).
34. PA. DEPT. ENVTL. PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
NUTRIENT TRADING SUPPLEMENT 1 (2016). The EPA was not convinced that nutrient credits
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Pennsylvania’s ability to issue NPDES permits and the nascent nutrient
credit trading, DEP adopted a variety of interim measures including a 3:1
trading ratio starting in 2015. Also, DEP has suspended the certification of
new nutrient credits, so no new generators can enter the market.35
In addition to the problems that affect all nutrient credit schemes,
Pennsylvania’s system suffers from two self-imposed difficulties. The most
significant problem is the timing of the water year. Nutrient credits are
good for one water year, which begins on October 1 and ends the following
September 30.36 Pennsylvania set that as the compliance year since most
buyers hold NPDES permits and those permits follow the U.S. Geologic
Service water year, which coincides with the federal fiscal year.
Administrative convenience, however, conflicts with the weather.
Although the Atlantic hurricane season runs from June 1 to November 30,
there is a sharp peak in late August and early September.37 Thus, it is
possible that the state will see most of its heavy rain at the end of the water
year, when it is too late to generate credits or adjust plant operation to
reduce the need for credits. On the farm, heavy rain can damage riparian
buffers and wash manure into streams. Also, waste water treatment plants
are often overwhelmed by heavy rain, especially if the city uses a combined
sanitary and storm drain system. Thus, managers release untreated or
undertreated water rather than see the waste water treatment plant destroyed
by flooding. Of the sixty-four combined systems in the Chesapeake
watershed, forty are in Pennsylvania.38
There is a second problem with Pennsylvania’s approach to nutrient
credit trading. Pennsylvania has encouraged the development of credit
auctions.
The Pennsylvania Infrastructure Investment Authority
(“PENNVEST”) provides funding to local government, including for waste
water treatment. In addition, PENNVEST created a nutrient credit auction,
which it calls a clearinghouse. The auctions determine a single price, which
applies to all completed trades.39 Participants in the auction do not deal
directly; instead PENNVEST is the counterparty to all buyers and sellers.
The auction is structured so that buyers cannot bid on specific credits

could be calculated from the better management practices without measurement. U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, PENNSYLVANIA’S TRADING AND OFFSET PROGRAMS REVIEW
OBSERVATIONS 9 (2012).
35. PA. DEPT. ENVTL. PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
NUTRIENT TRADING SUPPLEMENT 1, 7–8 (2016).
36. PA. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
NUTRIENT TRADING SUPPLEMENT 2 (2016).
37. NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE PEAK OF THE HURRICANE SEASON–
WHY NOW? (2016), http://www.noaa.gov/stories/peak-of-hurricane-season-why-now.
38. CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 1, at 4-18, Tbl 4-13.
39. PENNVEST NUTRIENT CREDIT CLEARINGHOU SE RULEBOOK: VERSION 8, at 2 (2017).

2018]

COVARIANT RISK AND NUTRIENT CREDIT TRADING

11

generated by specific sellers. Instead, every seller receives the same price,
regardless of the seller’s reliability or method for generating credits.
While single-price auctions are good at determining prices for
homogenous goods, nutrient credits are not homogenous. Each credit
represents an identical reduction in nutrients, but quality of the credit is
highly variable. Some credits are generated in a way that is robust and
verifiable. As noted before, waste water treatment plants generate credits of
very certain value. Other credits may depend on management practices that
are unmonitored, for example manure application. Also, the identity of the
seller matters. The buyer wants a solvent seller, especially in the event the
seller cannot deliver the credits. A solvent seller can buy replacement
credits to deliver to the buyer if she is unable to generate the credits herself.
Municipal water authorities have resources beyond most farmers and
other credit generators. Water authorities receive a steady stream of
revenue from ratepayers and often borrow money. In contrast, farmers have
uncertain revenues and very limited access to credit. Many small farms are
already highly leveraged, meaning there is no capacity to absorb a shock
like unexpectedly unavailable credits. But, nutrient credit buyers want a
solvent seller, so that in the event of breach, the buyer can be made whole,
either by buying replacement credits or paying whatever fine is levied for
noncompliance.
Single-price auctions prevent buyers from verifying credits and
supercharge Gresham’s Law. Even if they wanted, buyers cannot select
their sellers. Price is the only thing that matters because the auction has
been designed to find a single market price and ignore every other aspect of
the transaction. Instead of an auction, Pennsylvania should encourage
either direct sales or the emergence of brokers. As larger, repeat players,
brokers will have more resources and thus be able to substitute for the
insolvent farmers. Since brokers do not want to substitute for their
defaulting credit generators, brokers will police the reliability of sellers.
Also, brokers will have reputations to preserve, so there should be pressure
to verify nutrient credits.
III. COVARIANT RISK
The existing literature on nutrient credit trading has not identified
covariant risk as a stumbling block. Covariance is a measure of the degree
to which two variables move in tandem. Thus, covariant risk is the risk that
two events will occur at the same time. Identifying covariant risk is
particularly important because covariant risk may be the most significant
challenge for nutrient trading and one that better market design cannot
overcome. In contrast, other shortcomings in existing nutrient trading
schemes can be overcome by improved verification and enforcement,

12

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[VOL. 77:1

setting appropriate baselines, and shifting the timing of the water year.
Conversely, covariant risk is inescapable and probably dooms nutrient
credit trading.
Nutrient credit trading cannot eliminate the risk that all participants
suffer from the same event. Rain affects water quality on both sides of the
nutrient credit trading. In the Chesapeake watershed, hurricanes (and
related tropical storms) bring heavy rain, even very far inland. When
rainfall is high, many sellers cannot generate the credits promised. Heavy
rainfall increases run-off from farms. More importantly, stream buffers and
other management practices are degraded by erosion during heavy rain.
Heavy rain will affect all farm sellers similarly, shrinking the number of
credits available. Some waste water treatment plants generate credits by
removing nutrients in excess of their legal obligation. But in many cities,
storm drains combine with sanitary drains, overwhelming the treatment
infrastructure.40 When storm water overwhelms the plant, untreated (or
undertreated) water is released and fewer credits are generated. Even
though farmers and waste water treatment plants generate nutrient credits in
very different ways, both are affected by the same heavy rain. The only
nutrient credit generators largely immune to the weather are those who
truck poultry manure outside of the watershed.41
For essentially the same reasons, nutrient credit buyers need more
credits when there is heavy rain. Heavy rain overwhelms all waste water
treatment plants, not just those operating beyond the regulatory standard.
Thus, a waste water treatment plant that expected to release a certain
nutrient concentration would release more nutrients than anticipated. Those
excess nutrients must be offset by credits purchased. If the heavy rain came
earlier in the water year, it might be possible to meet the regulatory
requirement by treating water for the rest of the year to a higher standard.
Near the end of the water year, there is no alternative except purchasing
nutrient credits.
Heavy rain increases demand while shrinking supply. Thus, the price
will increase sharply as buyers compete for the few credits available.
Heavy rain will produce price spikes and shortages, making nutrient credit
trading less attractive because buyers will not be able to find enough credits
and those credits will be extremely expensive. Buying nutrient credits will
not be a cost-effective way to meet the requirement, instead it will be an
unpredictable and heavy expense. Although municipal water authorities
can pass costs onto ratepayers or borrow, neither is attractive since
40. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, IMPACTS AND CONTROL OF CSOS AND
SSOS (2004).
41. PA. DEPT. ENVTL. PROTECTION, PHASE 2 WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
NUTRIENT TRADING SUPPLEMENT 7–8 (2016).
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ratepayers are sensitive to price increases and authorities, as public
institutions, are politically constrained. Even entirely private water
companies operate in a somewhat political environment because the social
expectation is that water will be both plentiful and cheap, unlike other
markets.
But, the effect on price and quantity is probably less important than the
effect on trades already done. Many of the sellers will be unable to deliver
the promised credits. Farmers will not be able to generate credits from now
destroyed stream buffers. Waste water treatments plants that operated
above the standard earlier in the year to generate nutrient credits will see the
expected credits disappear as the plant releases nutrient-heavy water during
heavy rain. For the same reason that replacement credits are needed,
replacement credits may be unavailable. Sellers will find their investment
in credit generation devalued or even made worthless, discouraging them
from generating credits in the future. Buyers will find that relying on
nutrient credit trading was false comfort. Buyers with NPDES permits are
not exempt from the permit requirements because the buyer contracted to
buy credits that were never delivered.42 Instead, buyers will find that
nutrient credit trading does not help them meet regulatory requirements, at
least in years with heavy rain late in the water year.
There are steps that buyers can take to protect themselves from heavy
rain and the consequent price spikes and defaults. Buyers could (better)
ensure sufficient credits by purchasing more credits than necessary in a
typical year. A buyer would have to acquire credits sufficient to satisfy
both its greater need for credits and the expected default rate. In a year
without heavy rain, many of the credits would expire unused. In dry years,
the typical buyer would need fewer credits because its effluent had fewer
nutrients. Also, its counterparties would not default. In years with heavy
rain, however, the buyer would use every credit, both because its effluent
was nutrient-rich and therefore, the buyer needed more credits, but also
because many of the sellers it bought credits from would default. If the
buyer can recover the sales price from defaulting sellers, the cost of this
extra assurance in wet years might not be so great. But, many sellers will
be insolvent in wet years. In dry years, however, unused credits would
appear to be a very expensive form of assuring that sufficient credits were
available.
But, it is unclear whether allowing many credits to expire unused each
year is politically feasible. In every dry year, many more credits would be
bought than used, which looks like waste. To pay for credits that might
42. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT FOR PERMIT
WRITERS: WATER QUALITY TRADING SCENARIO: POINT SOURCE–NONPOINT SOURCE TRADING
29 (2009).
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expire unused in most years, the municipal water authority would have to
impose higher water rates than if it never bought credits that expired
unused. Even if the cost of letting nutrient credits expire in dry years is less
than the cost of meeting the regulatory standard through plant
improvements (or higher ongoing treatment costs), the apparent waste
presents a communication problem. That problem is two-fold because the
plant managers must convince both the authority’s board and the public that
the plant will buy nutrient credits, some of which will expire unused in
most years. In a climate hostile to government spending, the cost of letting
credits expire unused may be insurmountable. Even if cheaper, unused
credits look like waste and oftentimes the perception dominates the reality.
Covariant risk may doom nutrient credit trading. This author is
pessimistic, but the architects of nutrient credit schemes can attempt to
minimize the effect of covariant risk by doing three things:
First, the end of the water year should not fall during the hurricane
season. Instead, the water year should end just before, perhaps in midsummer. If the water year begins with the hurricane season, both buyers
and sellers have the remainder of the year to plan accordingly. While
farmers may struggle to generate large numbers of credits between
November and the following June, other sellers can generate credits
quickly. For example, waste water treatment plants can treat water beyond
the permit requirement.
Second, regulating one year at a time may be suboptimal. Since
rainfall varies from year to year, a longer regulatory period should reduce
the risk of heavy rain and therefore market failure. In a sense, each year’s
rainfall is a sample from the population which is the climate. Larger
samples should be more regular than smaller samples. A longer period than
one year, however, does not protect against the risk that the heavy rain will
come at the end of the period. Heavy rain at the end of a water decade
presents the same problems as heavy rain at the end of the water year.
Additionally, a longer period would allow water quality to suffer in any
given year, so long as water quality over the period met the standard. Many
biological processes depend on water quality at every moment, not just on
average. Fish need water with dissolved oxygen continuously, not just on
average. Since the climate is not stable, a long-term trend of increasing
rain, and heavy rain, in particular, could present recurrent end of period
problems. On average, the end of every period will appear wetter than
expected because the long-term trend is towards heavy rain.43 Therefore, a
longer regulatory period may not cure the problem.

43. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE
THE UNITED STATES 44 (2014).

RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
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Lastly, letting credits expire unused presents a communication
problem, which becomes a political problem. To solve the problem of
perception, the architects of nutrient trading schemes may want to add
another layer of deception. The unused credits are insurance, but it might
be more palatable if a market intermediary held the credits that expire
unused. Insurance is prudent and thus an insurance policy is not waste.
While paying an insurance premium is equivalent to buying credits that will
expire unused, buyers may find it more palatable. Of course, the market
regulator will need to oversee the insurer for the same reasons that
government regulates more traditional types of insurance. Setting aside
insufficient assets (buying too few credits) would provide a competitive
advantage and thus reckless insurers would come to dominate the market, at
least until the wet year when the insurance would fail. There are costs
associated with market intermediaries, which will ultimately be borne by
buyers, but the increased costs may be less than the alternative, which is
avoiding nutrient credit trading because of the communication problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nutrient credit trading suffers from several shortcomings already
identified in the literature, including the difficulty of verification, regulatory
arbitrage, and the inherent difficulties in setting baselines and trading ratios.
In Pennsylvania, nutrient credit trading suffers from several specific
difficulties, including the mistiming of the regulatory year and an emphasis
on auctions. None of the existing literature, however, identifies covariant
risk, which this Article argues may present an insurmountable obstacle to
nutrient credit trading.
In the eastern United States, our weather “sendeth rain on the just and
on the unjust.”44 Heavy rain prevents sellers from generating credits. The
same rain means that buyers need more credits. The market for nutrient
credits will see unstable prices, with predictable peaks in price (with
potential shortages) at unpredictable times. The result is that nutrient credit
trading may be impossible because unstable prices will make planning by
both buyers and sellers impossible.
Covariant risk may present
insurmountable problems for nutrient credit trading, suggesting that direct
regulation of agriculture may be necessary.

44. Matthew 5:45 (King James).

